There is nothing I can report to you from our one-and-a-half hour meeting with Defense Minister Ehud Barak at our offices today, as it was agreed beforehand that the briefing would be entirely off record.
What I can do however, is to give you my impressions of Barak at this point in time, and the thing that stands out most about him right now is that he is angry and feels that he needs to act: angry at the way the government is handling things in general; angry at Kadima, angry at what he believes are lost opportunities and wasted resources.
When talking about strategic and defense issues – Barak’s words were measured and his tone relaxed, and I got that reassured feeling that on these matters, Ehud Barak is the best possible person for the job. One year into the job as Defense Minister, Barak is confident that the security establishment is on the right track to meet the threats of the future, and he comes across as eminently believable.
When he started talking about politics, his tone became harsher, the volume of his speech jumped up several decibels, and his whole manner became more aggressive. He became animated, waving his arms around, stressing certain points banging his fist on the table. When Ehud Barak looks at Kadima, he sees a party that gave us the Disengagement [the law of unintended consequences is no excuse], Ehud Olmert’s corruption probes, Tzahi Hanegbi’s corruption probes, Avram Hirshzon’s corruption indictment, Haim Ramon’s indecent assault indictment, and the various corruption suspicions against Ariel Sharon himself. He sees a party that is occupied entirely with its own survival; a party that promised a new way, and now looks very much like the Likud it broke away from. He sees a government with its head in the clouds, a government that doesn’t see things clearly and doesn’t take decisive action. He can’t understand why most Kadima ministers want to take down Hamas in Gaza, when such a thing seems to him to be an impossible illusion. He believes Israel and Hamas are on a collision course, but that the movement itself cannot be wiped out until the Palestinians themselves choose different political paths. The most that can be achieved militarily is the decimation of the Hamas military and political leadership, but the movement cannot be snuffed out; Israel cannot dictate to the Palestinian people which political movements it chooses. From my discussions with army officials, I can tell you that senior IDF officers share this assessment.
When he looks at his good friend Ehud Olmert, he sees a politician that cannot continue in his position. I’m not divulging anything here as Barak has publicly called on Olmert to take a leave of absence and for Kadima to replace him. Who knows, maybe Olmert’s legal problems will turn out to be no big deal, which he hopes they will, and one day Olmert could make a return to politics. But not now.
He clearly doesn’t like the way Cabinet decisions are taken, or not taken, on almost every single issue on the national agenda. As a former commando, he loathes indecision, hesitation and drawn-out discussions that lead nowhere. In his mind, the house [the country] is on fire and he needs to save it. He is worried about where the country is headed and feels like he needs to shape its course.
Conclusion: Barak has officially started his campaign to be the next Prime Minister, again. He has already had similar briefings with the editorial staff of at least two other big newspapers recently. He doesn’t want elections now [polls show Netanyahu would be PM if elections were held now]. He wants Kadima to replace Olmert with Livni, and he wants more time at defense ministry headquarters, as his political comeback hasn’t caught traction yet. He’s not afraid of any of Israel’s enemies, and he’s not afraid of elections.
